Showing posts with label moral ojectivism. Show all posts Wednesday, November 7, The Moral Hypocracy of Religion Debating with fundamentalist theists is always entertaining, especially on the issue of morality.
The WAP makes it clear that the mere improbability of our own universe is not evidence for divine design. Without evidence for divine design, there is no rational basis for belief in a designer. The Kalam Cosmological Argument: Guminski According to a form of the kalam cosmological argument expounded by William Lane Craig, there cannot be a beginningless temporal world because the application of Cantorian set theory of transfinite arithmetic to the real world generates counterintuitive absurdities, thereby disclosing that an infinite set of real entities is metaphysically impossible.
This article shows how this is not the case by pursuing a novel approach wherein it is understood that an infinite set of real entities is not a set, considered as a technical term of art, within the meaning of Cantorian theory.
Upon accepting the original version for publication, Quentin Smith, then editor of Philo, wrote: More importantly, it introduces a novel metaphysical theory of the relation of transfinite arithmetic to concrete reality. The Question of the Metaphysical Possibility of an Infinite Set of Real Entities" showed that the argument by William Lane Craig and others that real infinites are metaphysically impossible presupposes the standard version SV of how Cantorian set theory presumably applies to the real world.
This is the case because it is the application of SV to the real world which generates counterintuitive absurdities. However, there Guminski also showed that there is an alternative version AV of applying Cantorian set theory to the real world, the application of which does not generate counterintuitive absurdities.
In the present paper he shows that given AV, an infinite temporal series is metaphysically possible, producing a result that should be equally satisfying to both theists and nontheists who are loath to believe that a beginningless temporal world is metaphysically impossible.
However much theists and nontheists may disagree about other issues, they are at least able to agree upon one important thing: An Analysis of Arnold T.
In the first of two previous papers, Arnold T. Guminski presents his solution to the problem of counterintuitive absurdities, which he believes results from applying Cantorian theory to the real world. However, his alternative version of the application of Cantorian theory to the real world attempts to achieve by a priori methods what can only be accomplished a posteriori, raises the question of whether a set theory can be fully developed that is consistent with it, and addresses "counterintuitive absurdities" that are not absurdities at all.
The Kalam Cosmological Argument as Amended: The Question of the Metaphysical Possibility of an Infinite Temporal Series of Finite Duration In this third paper about the Kalam Cosmological Argument KCAGuminski shows how William Lane Craig has developed a mutated form of the argument such that it presupposes the metaphysical possibility of an infinite temporal series of finite duration.
The KCAAA relies upon the Standard Big Bang Model as providing the supposed factual basis for concluding that the universe has a finite but indefinite past, thus involving an infinite temporal series of finite duration.
Guminski argues why there is good reason to hold that any infinite temporal series of finite duration is metaphysically impossible given the A-theory of time, absolute simultaneity, and some complementary doctrines--assumptions that Craig accepts.
Particular attention is given to the writings of J. Vague analogies with firing squads and arbitrarily selected probabilities may lead to some interesting speculations, but they do not point to any significant evidence for some kind of creator.
In a series of recent articles, William Craig has attempted to show that these criticisms are "superficial, ill-conceived, and based on misunderstanding".use the following search parameters to narrow your results: subreddit:subreddit find submissions in "subreddit" author:username find submissions by "username" site:initiativeblog.com fin.
Craig has not done this, so he fails to distinguish his moral law giver from any other plausible moral law giver. Even is Craig is right, and moral imperatives stem from some moral law giver, for all we know this moral law giver could be the Flying Spaghetti Monster.
This entry is part 3 on a series of the moral argument and William Lane Craig. The entries in the series: Craig will have a difficult time arguing his case for premise 2 before group #1 atheists in a way that doesn’t beg the question in favor of theism.
much more must be done than hold out possibility that naturalism may be true. For. Mar 15, · The Argument from Morality - Debunked (William Lane Craig’s Moral Argument Refuted) and especially in the form of Dr.
William Lane Craig’s. In this video, I raise but a few of the critical. Dr. Craig opens the debate with his two primary contentions. First, that if god exists, he offers a sound foundation for the existence of objective morals and duties, and second, that if god does not exist, then we do not have a sound foundation for objective moral duties and values.
Dr. Craig’s moral argument for god, goes a little something like this: 1.
If god does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist Refuting William Lane Craig: The Moral Argument; Is Being an Atheist a Choice? Stephen Law. Defining antisemitism 5 weeks ago The Secular Outpost.
A Case for Atheism: Outline and Introduction.